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Parmenidean Monism and The Routes of Being
Abstract
It is well known that Parmenides presents his concept of being in an unified way, 
and if he distinguished different senses of being he never did that explicitly. However, 
the tradition of commentaries of his poem attempts to distinguish the many senses 
of being there involved. One very famous interpretation initiated by Russell and 
supported by many scholars throughout the Twentieth Century claims that the 
paradoxical result of Parmenides's monism is a consequence of his incapacity to 
discern the three basic senses of the verb to be: identity, predication and existence. 
Patricia Curd (1998) proposed a revolutionary interpretation of the poem. 
According to Curd, Parmenides does not propound the thesis of numerical monism 
(the claim that there exist only one thing) despite the many centuries of commentaries 
that read the poem as a proposition of this thesis. Instead of that, she suggests that 
Parmenides held the thesis of  “predicational monism”, according to which “each 
thing that is can be only one thing; it can hold only the one predicate which indicates 
what it is”. Building upon previous results given by Alexander Mourelatos, Curd 
argues that the verb to be in Parmenides's poem is primarily predicative and that, 
according to the Parmenidean thesis, the only acceptable way to use “is” is in a 
predication of essence. The interpretation proposed by Curd and Mourelatos has 
been regarded as satisfactory by many scholars on the basis that they incorporate 
the results of  new investigations on the sense of the verb to be, such as Kahn's 
publications against the existential reading of this verb in Ancient Greek texts. 
As an indirect counterargument to Curd's interpretation, I will present a reading 
of Parmenides's  thesis on being that incorporates the recent results of Kahn's 
investigation while still deriving the traditional result of numerical monism. I take 
the veridical sense of the verb to be as basic in order to interpret Parmenides's 
statements on  the “two routes of investigation”: the way of being and the way of 
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non-being. According to my view, the two routes represent an attempt of definition 
of the concepts of Truth and Falsehood. I understand Parmenides's contradictory 
formulation of the way of non-being (that it is not and by necessity is not-being) as 
a recognition of the apparent contradiction involved in the attempt to define what is 
false by means of a true sentence. For if there is a sentence that correctly describes 
the non-being, it is a true sentence and therefore belongs to the other route, the route 
of being, the route of truth. I will show how numerical monism can be easily reached 
from the acceptance of this starting point.
Keywords: Parmenides . Ontology . Monism . Being . Reference
Resumo
É amplamente reconhecido que Parmênides apresenta seu conceito de Ser 
de uma maneira unificada, sem nunca distinguir explicitamente os diferentes 
sentidos deste verbo. Apesar disso, a tradição de comentários vem há 
muito tentanto distinguir os diferentes sentidos de “ser” envolvidos em sua 
argumentação. Um interpretação, proposta inicialmente por Russell e que se 
tornou muito influente durante o século XX, afima que o resultado paradoxal 
do monismo parmenídico é uma consequência direta da sua incapacidade 
de distinguir os três sentidos básicos do verbo ser: identidade, predicação e 
existência.   
Patricia Curd (1998) propõe uma interpretação revolucionária do poema. 
De acordo com Curd, Parmênides não adota a tese do monismo numérico (a 
afirmação de que só existe uma única coisa), a despeito do fato de que, há 
muito séculos, a tradição de comentário identifica o poema como a proposição 
desta tese. Em lugar do monismo numérico, Curd afirma que Parmênides 
adotava o “monismo predicativo”, de acordo com o qual “cada coisa que é 
pode ser apenas uma coisa, podendo possuir apenas o predicado que indica 
o que esta coisa é.” Amparada em resultados previamente alcançados por 
Alexandre Mourelatos, Curd argumenta que o verbo “ser” no poema de 
Parmênides possui um valor primariamente predicativo e que, de acordo com 
tese de Parmênides, a única maneira legítima de usar este verbo é em uma 
predicação de essência. A interpretação proposta por Curd e Mourelatos foi 
considerada satisfatória por muitos especialistas, sob o argumento de que tal 
interpretação incorpora os resultados das investigações mais recentes acerca 
dos sentidos do verbo “ser”,  como os estudos de Kahn contra a possibilidade 
de uma leitura existencial para este verbo em textos gregos antigos.  
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Como contra-argumentação indireta à interpretação de Curd, apresentarei 
uma leitura do poema de Parmênides que incorpora os resultados dos 
estudos de Kahn, ao mesmo tempo que ainda é capaz de derivar o resultado 
mais tradicional do monismo numérico. Considero o sentido veritativo do 
verbo “ser” como o sentido fundamental para compreensão das afirmações de 
Parmênides sobre os dois “caminhos de investigação”:  o caminho do ser e o 
caminho do não-ser. De acordo com minha interpretação, os dois caminhos 
representam uma tentativa de definição dos conceitos de Verdade e Falsidade. 
Eu compreendo a formulação contraditória de Parmênides para o caminho do 
não-ser (que é e que necessariamente é não-ser) como o reconhecimento da 
aparente contradição envolvida em se tentar definir o que é falso por meio de 
uma sentença verdadeira. Pois, se há um sentença que corretamente defina 
o que não é, então esta sentença é verdadeira e, portanto, pertence ao outro 
caminho, o caminho do ser, o caminho da verdade. Pretendo demonstrar 
como o monismo numérico pode ser facilmente alcançado a partir desta 
interpretação. 
Palavras-chave: Parmênides . Ontologia . Monismo . Ser . Referência
It is well known that Parmenides presents his concept of being in a uni-
fied way, and if he distinguished different senses of being he never did that 
explicitly. However, the tradition of commentaries of his poem attempts to 
distinguish the many senses of being there involved. One very famous inter-
pretation initiated by Russell and supported by many scholars throughout the 
Twentieth Century claims that the paradoxical result of Parmenides’s monism 
is a consequence of his incapacity to discern the three basic senses of the verb 
to be: identity, predication and existence. 
Patricia Curd (1998) proposed a revolutionary interpretation of the poem. 
According to Curd, Parmenides does not propound the thesis of numerical 
monism (the claim that there exists only one thing) despite the many cen-
turies of commentaries that read the poem as a proposition of this thesis. 
Instead of that, she suggests that Parmenides held the thesis of “predicational 
monism”, according to which “each thing that is can be only one thing; it 
can hold only the one predicate which indicates what it is”. Building upon 
previous results given by Alexander Mourelatos, Curd argues that the verb to 
be in Parmenides’s poem is primarily predicative and that, according to the 
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Parmenidean thesis, the only acceptable way to use “is” is in a predication 
of essence. The interpretation proposed by Curd and Mourelatos has been 
regarded as satisfactory by many scholars on the basis that they incorporate 
the results of new investigations on the sense of the verb to be, such as Kahn’s 
publications against the existential reading of this verb in Ancient Greek texts. 
As an indirect counterargument to Curd’s interpretation, I will present a 
reading of Parmenides’s  thesis on being that incorporates the recent results 
of Kahn’s investigation while still deriving the traditional result of numeri-
cal monism. I take the veridical sense of the verb to be as basic in order to 
interpret Parmenides’s statements on the “two routes of investigation”: the 
way of being and the way of non-being. According to my view, the two routes 
represent an attempt of definition of the concepts of Truth and Falsehood. I 
understand Parmenides’s contradictory formulation of the way of non-being 
(that it is not and by necessity is not-being) as a recognition of the apparent 
contradiction involved in the attempt to define what is false by means of a 
true sentence. For if there is a sentence that correctly describes the non-being, 
it is a true sentence and therefore belongs to the other route, the route of 
being, the route of truth. I will show how numerical monism can be easily 
reached from the acceptance of this starting point.
Introduction
It is really an understatement to say that Parmenides’s arguments influenced 
those who came after him. In fact, it can be sustained that the concept of be-
ing and the guidelines for philosophical investigation outlined in his poem 
shaped all the philosophical systems of antiquity. The power of Parmenides’s 
argumentation comes from the fact that he adopts very strong, undeniable 
premises and reach surprisingly paradoxical results. As a consequence, all 
the late presocratic philosophers, as well as Plato and Aristotle, took the chal-
lenge of preserving the basic intuition behind Parmenides’s concept of being 
without compromising themselves with his controversial conclusions.
Recently, one of the most prominent paradoxical results of Parmenides’s 
Poem had its legitimacy contested. Modern interpreters maintain that Par-
menides was not a monist, or at least not the kind of monist that the tradi-
tion usually considers him to be. Patricia Curd, a supporter of this claim, 
distinguishes three kinds of monism: material, numerical, and what may be 
called predicational monism. Material monism claims that there is just one 
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underlying matter out of which the whole universe is made. One famous 
example of material monist is Thales of Miletus for whom everything is made 
of water. Numerical monism, in its turn, asserts that there is just one item 
in the universe. According to a numerical monist there exists just a single 
entity and nothing else. And finally predicational monism is the claim that 
“each thing that is can be only one thing; it can hold only one predicate, and 
must hold it in a particularly strong way”. If it is, say F, it must be all, only, 
and completely F. 
Of course, these three sorts of monism are mutually independent; mate-
rial monism, for example, is consistent with the existence of many numeri-
cally distinct things, provided each one is made out of or is a modification of 
a single fundamental stuff. Predicational monism is consistent with an ontol-
ogy composed by a plurality of numerically and materially distinct things, on 
condition that each one can hold only the one predicate that indicates what 
it is. And numerical monism is compatible with the idea that the single entity 
that exists is subject to a plurality of predicates and is composed by a variety 
of different materials. It is also clear that more than one of these three kinds 
of monism can be maintained at the same time; a theory might adopt both 
material and numerical monism, for instance, and a numerical monist might 
also hold predicational monism by claiming that the only existent thing can 
hold just one predicate. However, according to Curd and the proponents of 
the new interpretation Parmenides was exclusively a predicational monist, 
and did not actually care about how many items can be found in the universe 
nor about what stuff they are made. 
By claiming that Parmenides was a predicational monist rather than a nu-
merical monist, Curd and part of the modern scholarship confront a tradition 
of interpretation that goes back at least to Plato, who described Parmenides’s 
thesis as the claim that “the all is one” (Parm.128b1). And in order to support 
such a controversial claim, these authors put forward an equally innovative 
analysis of Parmenides’s Poem. This analysis is based on a new reading of 
fragment B2, the fragment in which the goddess states the content of the only 
two possible routes of investigation: the way of being and the way of not-
being. In the next section, I will analyze this innovative reading of fragment 
B2, and consider its pros and cons. After that, I will present my own reading 
of B2 which preserves some of the positive aspects of the new interpretation 
while avoiding its negative consequences. 
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The New Reading of Fragment B2
In a very crude translation, fragment B2 of Parmenides’s Poem would run 
like this:
Come, I shall tell you, and you who listen, receive my word,
What are the only routes of investigation there are to think:
The one, that “is” and that is not for not being,
Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon truth);
The other, that “is not” and that necessarily is for not being,
That, I point to you to be a path from which no tidings ever come,
For you could not know what is not (as it is not possible),
Nor could you point it out [...]
The conceptual core of Parmenides’s philosophy can be found in the sen-
tences that describe the   only two possible routes of inquiry: The one, that 
says: “is” and that is not for not being, and the other, that says: “is not” and 
that necessarily is for not being. These sentences formulate Parmenides’s ba-
sic premises, and it is widely accepted that the understanding of the whole 
argument behind his poem lies in the correct interpretation of these lines. In 
order to decode these enigmatic sentences, scholarship has focused primarily 
on two questions. 1) What subject is to be supplied for the bare “is” and “is 
not” that figure in the sentences? 2) What is the sense of the verb “to be” at 
work in Parmenides’s assertions about being? 
During the last century, a wide range of answers have been offered to these 
questions. With regard to the first, for example, a group of interpreters be-
lieve the sentences actually had an expressed subject in the original text, but 
it was lost in the manuscript tradition and, therefore, this lost subject needs 
to be recovered through the clues provided by the surviving text. Among this 
group there are those who claim that the lost subject of both sentences is the 
nominal use of the Greek verb “to be”; those who claim that the two sentences 
must have had different subjects, and propose “being” as the subject of the 
first sentence, and “not-being” as the subject of the second; and those who 
claim that the lost word is an indefinite pronoun rather than another occur-
rence of the verb “to be”. A different line of interpretation maintains that the 
sentences never had a grammatical subject, but a conceptual one which must 
be supplied by the reader. Conjectures about what would be this conceptual 
subject range from the tautological “the absolute being” (Mansfeld, 1985: 
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45) or “the existent” to complex concepts such as “all that is collectively real” 
(Robinson, 1979: 56) or “all that can be known” (Kahn, 1967: 708-710). 
The second question, about the sense of the verb “to be”, equally received 
a great variety of answers. In the secondary literature, we can find advocates 
not only of each one of the three basic senses of the verb (predication, iden-
tity, and existence) but also interpreters that see the parmenidean concept of 
“being” as the result of a confusion or a composition of these different mean-
ings. But more surprising than the vast number of different interpretations 
advanced by specialists is the fact that the supporters of all these different 
readings usually point out to the very same passages of the poem as evidence 
for their claims. Thus, the problem in answering these two questions is that 
the key passages of the text seem to count as evidence for all available conjec-
tures, as consequence these competing interpretations co-existed for a long 
time with little ground been gained or conceded on any side.     
An alternative to this deadlock situation was offered by Mourelatos who 
proposed that the occurrences of “to be” in fragment B2 should not be un-
derstood as fragments of propositions, but as references, from the stand point 
of a metalanguage, to certain modes of discourse. According to Mourelatos 
no textual or conceptual subject needs to be provided for the sentences, and 
although the expressions “is” and “is not” stand for positive and negative 
predication respectively, they are not instances of a predicative use of “to be”, 
but only representations of the two basic “types of proposition” or “forms of 
judgment”. So on this new view the verbs of the two routes are unresolved 
copulas with subject and predicate unspecified. The first route representing 
the “sentence frame” of positive predication and the second route the “sen-
tence frame” of negative predication, what is indicated in modern notation by 
the symbols Fx and ~Fx respectively.
I consider the idea of treating the bare “is” and “is not” of fragment B2 
as propositional functions rather than incomplete propositions to be the 
most important insight of Mourelatos’s interpretation. The strength of this 
idea comes from the fact that someone who comes across a bare “is” in the 
beginning of a sentence should not be expected to be able to fill this verb 
with conceptually complex subjects or predicates, since that would demand 
a great deal of prior understanding on the part of that reader at such an early 
stage of the argument. Therefore, in Mourelatos’s translation, the occurrences 
of the verb “to be” in B2 are represented with blanks on both the subject place 
and the predicate place in order to indicate that these open spaces represent 
variables which are not meant to be replaced.
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Unfortunately, Mourelatos does not explore further the consequences of 
this first insight, and as soon as he begins his analysis of Parmenides’s ar-
guments it becomes clear that he believes that Parmenides is using a very 
specific kind of predication. This special sense of the verb “to be”, dubbed 
by Mourelatos “the ‘is’ of speculative predication,” is supposed to feature in 
statements where the predicate “belongs essentially to, or is a necessary con-
dition for, the subject” and thus gives the subject’s reality, essence, nature, or 
true constitution (Mourelatos, 1970: 56–60). Well, it is clear that such kind 
of predication requires rather severe restrictions on the range of possible sub-
ject and predicate terms. Therefore, accepting it as the correct interpretation 
for Parmenides’s use of “to be” would move us back to a situation in which 
we have to assume prior understanding on the part of the reader in order to 
supply the correct subject an predicate and  make sense of the arguments. 
Another important drawback of this interpretation is that it prompts a good 
argument for predicational monism, but no argument whatsoever for numeri-
cal monism. Accordingly, those lines in Parmenides’s poem that have widely 
been thought to state numerical monism (B8.5-6, 8.22-5, 8.36-8; cf. B4) are 
read as referring specifically to the only kind of predication legitimated by 
Parmenides, that is, the one concerned to the genuine nature or essence of 
things.  As explained by Curd, for Parmenides “to be is to be the genuine 
nature of a thing, to be just what a thing is; to be such a nature, something 
must be what it is unchangingly, completely, and as a unity.” (Curd, 1998:20) 
A Veridical Reading of B2
Instead of interpreting Parmenides’s uses of “is” and “is not” in the rather 
specific sense of a “speculative predication” or a predication of essence, I 
want to propose a veridical interpretation for the most fundamental oc-
currences of the verb “to be” in fragment B2. According to this reading the 
Greek verb “to be” has the sense “to be true”, “to be so”, or “to be the case”. 
The importance of this veridical use is called to our attention by Aristotle, 
who describes it as one of the four philosophically relevant senses of the 
verb “to be” in his theoretical lexicon in Metaphysics’s Book V. He says, “And 
also being and is signify that (something) is true, and not being signify that it 
is not  true but false” (Met. V 7, 1017a 31). So, rather than attributing a syn-
tactical role to the bare is and is not that open the two important sentences, 
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I assign a veridical semantic function to them. As consequence, the two rou-
tes represent not only the sentential frames of positive and negative predica-
tion, but also designate the only two possible truth values; that is, the True 
(or what is the case), and the False (or what is not the case).
Before presenting my reading of B2, I would like to emphasize some of 
the formal (syntactical) characteristics of the veridical use of “to be”. To begin 
with, the veridical construction of the verb is absolute; that is, it does not 
carry any predicate or predicative complement attached to it. While, in the 
predicative use, we say that “x is F”, in the veridical construction, we say that 
“x is the case” without any term occupying the predicate place after the verb. 
On the other hand, while the predicative construction takes an object or an 
individual as subject; the subject of a veridical construction is propositional, 
since truth and falsehood are attributes of sentences, propositions or judg-
ments, but not of things, individuals or concepts. The third characteristic of 
a veridical use is that it is normally correlated with a clause containing a verb 
of saying or thinking. That clause provides the propositional content that oc-
cupies the subject place of the veridical constitution, and that is affirmed to 
be true or false by the verb “to be”.
In Parmenides’s fragment B2, that previous clause is provided by the in-
finitive verb noesai “to think” that figures in the sentence immediately before 
the enunciation of the two routes. This verb is usually translated in the pas-
sive voice, and the sentence rendered “the only two ways of investigation that 
are possible to think (or that can be conceived)”. However, it is also perfectly 
right to translate the infinitive noesai in the active voice, and render the sen-
tence as “the only two way of investigation there are to think”. This second 
translation seems better, since there are only two single ways to think about 
any intentional content, and each corresponds to the only two truth-values 
that can be attributed to it. The routes correspond to the activity of thinking 
proposed by each way: on one hand, there is the possibility to think that a 
given proposition is the case; and, on the other hand, there is another pos-
sibility to think that it (this same proposition) is not the case. It should be 
noticed, however, that the propositional content said to be true or false by 
the routes is not given to us. Therefore, it must be represented by a variable, 
following Mourelatos insight of treating the occurrences of the verb “to be” as 
propositional functions rather than fragments of propositions. Thus under-
stood, the key lines of B2 would run like this:
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Come, I shall tell you, and you who listen, receive my word,
What are the only routes of investigation there are to think:
The one, [to think] that P is the case and that not-P is not the case,
Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon truth);
The other, [to think] that P is not the case and that necessarily not-P 
is the case,
That, I point to you to be a path from which no tidings ever come,
For you could not know what is not (as it is not possible),
Nor could you point it out […]
The first positive consequence of this new reading is that according to it the 
contents of the two routes are self-evident truths. The first route states that if 
any given positive proposition (P) is true, then by logical necessity its nega-
tion (not-P) will be false. And the second route states that if any given posi-
tive proposition (P) is false them its negation (not-P) will be necessarily true. 
What makes Parmenides’s use of these logical equivalences unique is the fact 
that while he commend the first route as a path of persuasion, for it follows 
the truth, he rejects the second route as an impossible path. Parmenides give 
us ground for his rejection of the second route by saying that it is not possible 
to know what is not the case nor point it out. But what is it that true negative 
propositions and false propositions have in common, that can be explained as 
the incapacity to indicate or point out (phrásais) what is not?
I take Parmenides’s rejection of the route of not-being as a consequence 
of his affiliation to a particular version of the correspondence theory of truth. 
Such theory presupposes an ontology of facts (which may, or may not, live 
along with an ontology of objects) and deflects the problem of the truth of 
propositions to a prima facie problem of reference. Broadly speaking, the cor-
respondence theory of truth claims that a proposition is true if and only if the 
states of affairs that it describes obtains, ie. corresponds to some fact in the 
real world. So the proposition that “the snow is white” represents the state of 
affairs that the snow is white and is true only if this state of affairs obtains. On 
the other hand, according to this same theory, a proposition is false if the state 
of affairs that it describes does not correspond to any fact.
What is particular to Parmenides is that he adopts the correspondence 
theory of truth together with a strong realist ontology which prevents the 
existence of such a thing as a negative fact. Since the correspondence theory 
of truth states that a proposition is true only if there is a fact in the world in 
virtue of which it is true and there is no such thing as a negative fact, nega-
tive proposition cannot be rendered true due to its lack of correspondence, 
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and must, therefore, be paired with false propositions. On the account given 
above, ‘not-P’ is true only if ‘P’ is false, but ‘P’ is false only if it does not cor-
respond to any fact; hence, ‘not-P’ is not made true by any fact: it does not 
seem to have a truthmaker. As every truth must correspond to something 
in the world that makes it true, negative propositions are either false or 
nonsense.
An example can be used to clarify what I consider to be Parmenides’s basic 
intuition. Suppose we have an ontology composed only by these two facts:
 A  B
In a world like this, the positive propositions “Figure A is white” and “Figure 
B is black” are both true, since they correspond to the above facts (from left 
to right respectively). On the other hand, the positive propositions “Figure A 
is black” and “Figure B is white” are both false, since the states of affairs they 
describe do not obtain, ie. do not correspond to any fact in the ontology. Now, 
what fact in the ontology would make the negative propositions “Figure A is 
not black” and “Figure B is not white” true? Prima facie, these propositions 
do not correspond to any fact at all, just like false propositions. A possibility 
would be to say that these propositions correspond to the very same facts as 
do the propositions “Figure A is white” and “Figure B is black” respectively. 
The general form of this solution is the claim that for every negative truth 
“not-P” there exists a positive fact Q that is incompatible with “P”. So the fact 
that figure A is white plus the fact that being white is incompatible with being 
black account for the truth of the proposition “A is not Black”. But, in that 
case, what fact would account for the truth of propositions like “Figure A has 
no smell”? There seems to be no positive fact about A that is incompatible 
with the property of having smell to serve as the truthmaker of the proposi-
tion “Figure A has no smell”. Another possibility would be to say that, in this 
case, the truthmaker is the conjunction of all facts about figure A. Since that 
conjunction does not contain the fact that Figure A has smell, it constitutes 
the correct ontological account for the truth that Figure A has no smell. But 
then, the problem is that this big conjunction of facts, as we may call it, when 
taken by itself fails to necessitate the negative true “Figure A has no smell”. 
The big conjunction could exist and yet Figure A be smelling. 
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In any case, both tentative solutions do not contradict Parmenides’s prem-
ises, but rather presuppose Parmenides’s basic intuition that the universe, 
the world which knowledge is aiming at knowing, so to speak, is the totality 
of facts, and these facts can only be completely described by true positive 
propositions. Negative propositions, on the other hand, just like false propo-
sitions describe states of affairs that are not prima facie part of this totality of 
facts. In Parmenides’s words, false and true negative propositions represent 
an attempt to point out what is not the case. However, instead of developing 
complicate theories about what positive fact would play the role of truth-
maker for negative propositions, Parmenides’s radical solution is to dismiss 
all negative predication as false.
Two further positive consequences of this reconstruction of Parmenide’s 
argument is that it does not assume any prior understanding on the part of 
the reader nor presuppose any specific kind of predication, such as the rath-
er specialized sense of “speculative predication” on which Mourelatos and 
Curd’s interpretation rely, in order to make sense. Finally, this interpretation 
has the benefit of generating the kind of radical monism traditionally attribut-
ed to Parmenides, according to which there is just one homogenous thing to 
which all true propositions refer, and in which all differences are obliterated. 
In order to generate this paradoxical conclusion Parmenides needs to as-
sume the already explained premises that: a) Every meaningful proposition 
describes a state of affairs; b) A proposition is true if and only if the state of 
affairs it describes corresponds to a fact; and c) There are no “negative facts”, 
plus the optimist assumption that d) Every fact can be correctly described 
by a meaningful true proposition. From these four reasonable premises Par-
menides is able to reach the incredible conclusion that all true propositions 
describe the same fact. I will present what could have been Parmenides line 
of argumentation by means of a reduction, although there are more dialectical 
ways of presenting the same argument (cf. Pelletier, 1990). 
If there is more than one fact, then at least two distinct true propositions 
correspond to different facts, say proposition P1 and P2.
P1 and P2 correspond to different facts if and only if there is a true propo-
sition P3 which states that P1 and P2 correspond to different facts. (by the 
optimist assumption d) 
P3 is true if and only if “P1 does not corresponds to the same fact that P2 
corresponds” is true.
P3, being a negative proposition, is either false or meaningless. (by a, b, c,)
P3 is not true. (by 3 and 4)
P1 and P2 do not correspond to different facts. (by 1 and 5)
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* Este trabalho foi apresentado no 65º  Encontro Anual da Metaphysical Society of America. Apro-
veito a oportunidade para agradecer aos participantes deste encontro, em especial ao Prof. Wesley 
DeMarco, pelos valorosos comentários ao texto. 
There is just one fact to which all true propositions correspond.
As a final remark, I would like to point out that this same pattern of argu-
ment can be used to generate all further Parmenidean conclusions involving 
change, motion, coming-to-be, destruction, and so forth. For if such an event 
were to take place then some negative proposition would have to be true.
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